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ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND 
REGULATION 
Hans-W. Micklitz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Are we private lawyers not convinced that we share a common 
understanding of “freedom of contract,” of “freedom”1  and 
“contract,” and of restrictions on that freedom of contract through 
“regulation?”2 Is this common understanding not the basis on which 
we all operate implicitly or explicitly in our intellectual discourse 
cutting across different legal traditions and different legal cultures?3 At 
the very least, is not the notion of contract freedom shared in all 
countries governed by a market society and even more so if the market 
society is embedded into the Westernized model of democracy?4 
What if this common assumption turns out to be wrong or is 
no more than a rather superficial “gentleman’s agreement,” which 
allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our own 
preconceptions? Digging deeper into intellectual history, legal theory, 
and legal philosophy reveals that, for example, a French lawyer and an 
                                                 
*    Professor, European University Institute Florence.    
1   See generally UDO DI FABIO, DIE KULTUR DER FREIHEIT (2005) (for a 
German understanding of freedom of contract). 
2   See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999); Gary Marks, 
Liesbet Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance, 34 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 3341 (1996). 
3   See Kaarlo Tuori, Regulation Theories, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW: 
RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING 11-57 (Miguel Maduro, 
Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014); THE MANY CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE 
(Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2010). 
4   Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 
9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399 (2000). 
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English common lawyer may not necessarily be talking about the same 
thing when they argue about “freedom of contract.” This becomes 
even more complicated if we look at the limitations and restrictions on 
“freedom of contract,” which are set out via statutory regulation.5 
These lawyers might agree on what a state is by equating it with the 
“nation state,” but might encounter more problems in understanding 
and agreeing on the meaning of “regulation.” Regulation can be private 
or public. When created statutorily, regulation might facilitate or 
restrict freedom of contract. Statutory intervention, might, depending 
on one’s perspective (liberal or welfarist), trigger very different 
expectations, feelings, or sentiments. Our perception of “regulation” 
very much depends on what we expect as citizens from “our” state. 
This paper starts with two examples that are meant to highlight 
deeper cultural differences in deciding conflicting contractual issues. 
One example is taken from the French/German context, the other 
example is from the German/American context. These examples serve 
to underpin the hypothesis that the understanding of contract and 
regulation in the three countries under investigation – France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom – differs considerably and the 
reasons for the differences can be found in the intellectual history of 
the respective states. Further, this paper continues by contrasting the 
three different models of freedom of contract and regulation with the 
emerging European model. The hypothesis is that the European 
Union is yielding its own model which differs from the Member States 
model. This is not only due to the particular legal nature of the 
European Union as a quasi-state, but also to the changing economic 
and political environment after World War II. The conclusions remain 
tentative. The reader is invited to stand back and carefully look at the 
ongoing transformations of contract and regulation. Intellectual 
history and comparative research are the appropriate tools for such an 
exercise. 
                                                 
5   ROLF KNIEPER, ZWANG, VERNUNFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR 
JURISTISCHEN KONSTRUKTION DER GESELLSCHAFT (1981). 
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I.         ENGLISH-FRENCH DEFECTIVE SWIMMING POOLS 
A well-known pair of cases6 were decided before English and 
French courts facing a nearly identical problem.7 In Ruxley, a 
homeowner mandated a construction company to build a swimming 
pool in his garden.8 The water depth did not comply with what was 
agreed upon in the contract by twenty-two centimeters. The 
homeowner asked the construction company to rebuild the swimming 
pool. The House of Lords did not grant the homeowner specific 
performance.9 The House of Lords found that the swimming pool was 
usable, although not in the envisaged way; therefore, pecuniary 
damages sufficed to compensate the homeowner. Implicit in the 
House of Lords decision is the idea that it does not make sense to 
destroy a usable swimming pool just to satisfy the original contract. 
This combination of pragmatic and utilitarian considerations will be 
explained as the “English model.” 
Similarly, in France, a home was built thirty-three centimeters 
lower than what was agreed upon in the contract. In contrast to the 
House of Lords in Ruxley, however, the French Cour de Cassation held 
that the construction company must rebuild the house because it did 
not deliver exactly what was agreed to between the parties. Moreover, 
the construction company had to bear the full cost of reconstruction, 
and pecuniary damages did not suffice to compensate the homeowner 
for the broken promise.10 The “reason” behind the agreement 
prevailed over any other considerations one might have invoked. This 
“French model” will later be examined under this rationale. 
                                                 
6   Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] 3e civ., May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.). 
7   I have taken this example from Ruth Sefton-Green. Ruth Sefton-Green, 
The European Union, Law and Society: Making the Societal-Cultural Difference, in PRIVATE 
LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 37, 52 (Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. eds., 
2007). 
8   Id. at 52. 
9   Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd., [1996] A.C. 344. 
10   Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 3e civ., 
May 11, 2005, Bull. civ. III, no. 103 (Fr.). 
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Comparative lawyers who study these and other similar cases 
are aware of the differences between English common law and the 
French Civil Code.11 However, the fact that a layperson, had they to 
decide the case, would come to the same result tells us something 
about our legal consciousness, and the deeper assumptions we share 
about our own legal systems based on the expectations we have in the 
functioning of the courts and of society, for good and for bad. The 
Eurobarometer is a neat indicator that allows for a deeper look into 
these differing preconceptions at least between the twenty-eight E.U. 
Member States.12 We may speculate on what courts in the United 
States, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Italy, or Germany would have decided in 
a case similar to the English or French cases. I am sure there are similar, 
if not identical, cases, and I assume that a survey of the citizens of these 
countries would lead to results similar to my English-French 
comparison.13 If my assumption is correct, there must be a deeper layer 
of rationales enshrined in long-grown cultures and traditions behind 
the legal rules.14 
II.         GERMAN TOURISTS STRANDED IN FLORIDA 
My second example deals with consumer law, which restricts 
and limits freedom of contract via statutory intervention. In the early 
                                                 
11   Ruxley and the French example are not unique. They represent a well- 
established and long standing doctrine. See id.; see also Franz Werro, Comparative Studies 
in Private Law: A European Point of View, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION ON 
COMPARATIVE LAW 132-33 (Mauro Busani & Hugo Mattei eds., 2012). 
12   Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the 
evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of 
texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work. The surveys and studies 
address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation, 
health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence, etc. See, e.g., 
European Commission, Public Opinion, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
13   For example, the Trento Common Core Project is based on the idea 
that the same case is looked at through the eyes of different legal orders. THE 
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, http://www.common-core.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
14   At this point in my paper, I do not argue that these rationales are 
“eternal” in the sense of Pierre Legrand’s argument that European legal cultures are 
not converging. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996). 
2015 Micklitz 4:1 
5 
1990s, German tourists used a tour operator to book all-inclusive trips, 
which included transportation, accommodations, and meals, to Florida 
at a favorable price. The trip operator went bankrupt, and the German 
tourists found themselves stranded in Florida. The tourists were forced 
to buy tickets at their own cost to return to Germany.15 
The German tourists sued the German state under the 
Francovich doctrine.16 The tourists sought restitution or compensation 
of the costs for their return tickets.17 At the time of litigation, Germany 
had not implemented Directive 90/314/EEC on package tours.18 This 
Directive obliges Member States to shield consumers from the 
bankruptcy of tour operators and shifts the risk of default from the 
individual traveler to the community of travelers. The risk is thereby 
socialized, as all potential travelers must cover the costs for a fund the 
tour operator provides.19 The German state lost and its liability was 
later confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
in Dillenkofer.20 This was a costly lesson for the German state which 
had to pay roughly 20 million German Marks (10 million Euros). 
Consumer organizations and consumer victims celebrated the 
judgment as a great success. 
The societal dimension of the conflict underlying the case is of 
particular interest here. At the time of the intense debate on who 
should bear the costs of the stranded tourists, a German television 
                                                 
15   For the facts and the subsequent decision of the CJEU, see Joined 
Cases C-178, 179/94 & C-188-90/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 
16   Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5395. The Francovich doctrine creates non-contractual liability of Member States for 
violations of EU law: “a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to 
individuals as a result of breaches of [European Union] law for which the State can 
be held responsible.” Id. ¶ 35. 
17   Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 
18   Council Directive 90/314 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 June 1990 on Package Travel, Package Holidays, and Package Tours, 
1990 O.J. (L 15) (EC). 
19   Id. at art. 7; see STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND 
POLICY 98-101 (2005); Klause Tonner, Kommentierung des Kapitel 13: Reisevertrag, in 
ZIVILRECHT UNTER EUROPÄISCHEM EINFLUSS: DIE RICHTLINIENKONFORME 
AUSLEGUNG DES BGB UND ANDERER GESETZE – ERLÄUTERUNGEN DER 
WICHTIGSTEN EG-VERORDNUNGEN (Herausgeber Gebauer & Thomas Wiedmann 
eds., 2010). 
20   Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 
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program invited several of the stranded tourists and an American 
lawyer to discuss the proper remedy in the case. When given the 
opportunity to tell their stories, the German tourists said that, since a 
single return ticket cost three to four times more than the package tour, 
they went to the German embassy asking for financial support. At 
some point during the television program, the American lawyer asked 
the stranded tourists and the listeners a simple question: why not 
charter a plane? The lawyer suggested that chartering a plane would 
have been much less expensive for both the stranded tourists and for 
Germany. 
The lawyer’s question brings to light the expectations of 
German citizens, particularly the economically suspect deal of two 
weeks holidays in Florida for 500 to 600 German Marks. The tourists 
trusted the contract adage that a deal is a deal. Maybe the tourists 
subconsciously were also convinced that the German state would bail 
them out if their contractual expectations turned out to be wrong. 
Would consumers of a state other than Germany have had the same 
expectations of their contract with a package tour operator and of their 
state? Similarly, would these consumers have bombarded their 
embassies with complaints, or would they have chartered a plane? I 
assume that the expectations differ considerably. 
However, there is more at stake than the help provided by 
national embassies for stranded citizens. As a result of the Francovich 
doctrine, E.U. law equips all E.U. citizens with individually enforceable 
rights to force their state to pay for the transfer, provided the 
respective state has not implemented, or has not correctly 
implemented, the Directive on package tours. How is this possible? It 
is not that the Member States accept liability voluntarily. Instead, it is 
the European Union which imposes such liability on Member States 
via the CJEU. Thus, the regulation of package tours by the European 
Union not only sets boundaries for the freedom of package tour 
operators, who are forced to abide by the E.U. rules when exercising 
their economic activity, but also paves the way for more 
entrepreneurial freedom in a European market. 
2015 Micklitz 4:1 
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III.        THE CONDITIONS FOR A JOURNEY INTO INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 
This paper will now discuss the rationales behind the notion of 
freedom of contract by examining the German, French, U.K., and E.U. 
legal systems, all of which I am familiar with from extensive training 
and practice.21 I want to ground this discussion in my experiences with 
                                                 
21   A word is needed on my knowledge of foreign legal systems, especially 
since current comparative legal methodology is in a state of crisis. When I was 
educated in comparative legal research in the 1970s and 1980s, the thinking in 
Europe followed the ground-breaking work of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(Tony Weier trans., 3d ed. 1998); TONY WEIR ON THE CASE (Catherine Barnard et 
al. eds., 2012) . Legal systems were grouped around “legal families”—namely the four 
European families, the Romanic, the Germanic, the common law, and the Nordic 
countries—all of which share a common European culture, i.e., Roman law and 
Christian canon law. See Franz Wieacker & Edgar Bodenheimer, Foundations of 
European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1990); FRANZ WIEACKER, 
VORAUSSETZUNGEN EUROPÄISCHER RECHTSKULTUR VERLAG GÖTTINGER 
TAGEBLATT (1985). The method applied was a functional comparison by looking for 
the “best solution,” or the solution that best fit the differing traditions of the states. 
What is more important here was the pedagogical message inherent to the idea of 
legal families. Engaging in comparative law and comparative legal method requires 
not only knowledge of the language, but also knowledge of the country and the 
cultural foundations of the respective societies. This kind of knowledge, however, 
must be gained through training and education in the country itself. In that spirit, I 
benefited from the opportunity to study law in Switzerland (the French speaking 
part), France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Today, such a 
rigorous training requirement seems old-fashioned, as comparative lawyers have to 
engage in the comparison of countries and legal systems even if they know neither 
the language nor have fully experienced the country’s culture. The E.U. promoted 
this type of approach through its insistence on “inclusion,” which does not follow 
the traditional division of legal families, but converges the legal orders of twenty-
eight Member States. This approach leads to a comparison of legal systems via 
simplistic methods, such as tables and charts. I admit that I have been involved in 
this more modern approach. Interestingly enough, legal origin theory (LOT) took 
the legal families approach seriously, which could have reinvigorated the approach 
of Zweigert and Kötz. See generally LEGAL ORIGIN THEORY (Simon Deakin & 
Katharina Pistor eds., 2012) (analyzing the different strains of legal origin theory. 
However, what actually happened was that LOT revealed the weakness of thinking 
in families, as it cannot do justice to the deeper traditions and cultures of the 
countries compared. Professor Ralf Michaels labelled LOT “comparison in 
numbers,” and questioned why comparative lawyers remained so speechless in their 
reaction and did not defend the functional method. Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law 
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the countries’ culture and history. Building on previous research on 
social justice in private law22 and the (un)systematics of European legal 
culture,23 I seek to identify the dominating Rechtsbewußtsein, i.e., legal 
conscience,24 with respect to intellectual history, legal theory, and legal 
philosophy. Then, I want to transpose the intellectual history to my 
question on the cultural and societal foundations of freedom of 
contract. I am fully aware that modelling by country is risky and that it 
might look as if traditions and cultures are not subject to political, 
economic, and social change.25 I would defend, nevertheless, that such 
grouping around models is useful in identifying differences and maybe 
in deepening the mutual understanding of our conceptions of freedom 
of contract and the regulation thereof. 
                                                 
by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional 
Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009); see also Mathias M. Siems, 
Comparative Law (Oct. 21, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512938. 
22   See THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAW (Hans-W. Micklitz ed., 2011). 
23   Hans-W. Micklitz, The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of 
European Legal Culture, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 81-115 
(Geneviève Helleringer & Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014). 
24   See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); The Rule of Law, Political Choices and Developing Common Sense, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro 
Santos eds., 2006); MENTALITÄTEN-GESCHICHTE: ZUR HISTORISCHEN 
REKONSTRUKTION GEISTIGER PROZESSE (André Burguière & Ulrich Raulff eds., 
1987); Hagen Schulze, Mentalitätsgeschichte – Chancen und Risiken eines Paradigmas der 
französischen Geschichtswissenschaft, 36 GESCHICHTE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND 
UNTERRICHT 247 (1985). See also Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria, Geteilte 
Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt, in JENSEITS DES EUROZENTRISMUS: 
POSTKOLONIALE PERSPEKTIVEN IN DEN GESCHICHTS-UND 
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN 9-49 (Sebastian Conard & Shalini Randeria eds., 2002).  
25   See WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 251 (2009) (strongly critiquing that 
the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ neglects the two major driving forces of change in 
capitalist societies: the fear of workers and the greed of entrepreneurs); Dorothee 
Bohle & Béla Greskovits, Varieties of Capitalism and Capitalism << tout court >>, 50 
EUR. J. SOCIETY 355 (2009); Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties 
of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001)(a stock 
taking of the debate).  
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IV.         WHERE TO START WITH THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY? 
The analysis of the notion of freedom contract should begin 
with the Roman law. We can refer to the history of Roman law, and 
how its foundations have survived the last 2,000 years in both 
continental and common law countries;26 however, the historical 
ground might be less stable and less safe than its promoters pretend.27 
Regulation is much more complicated. The Roman Empire used what 
today we call “regulation” to govern the economy. “Regulations,” 
whether back then or now, have almost always been associated with 
the existence of a state and a territory. This brings us to the Peace of 
Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which laid the foundations for what 
later became the nation state. 
The benchmark for the beginning or the reinvigoration of 
Roman law is the foundation of the University of Bologna around 
1130/1140 and the scholastic school of law. According to Harold 
Berman, the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV, Holy 
Roman Emperor, a century earlier over the independence of the 
Church from the temporal power heralded and triggered the re-
establishment of Roman law, private law, and contract law.28 Berman 
argues that the separation of spiritual and temporal power not only 
initiated early state building and paved the way for the development of 
the nation state after the religious wars of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, but also led to the creation of the scholastic 
school of law first in Bologna and then elsewhere in Europe.29 The 
Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries led to a 
stronger intellectual exchange between the West and the East through 
the reinvigoration of Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as through 
                                                 
26   See Reinhard Zimmermann, “Heard Melodies are Sweet, but Those Unheard 
are Sweeter . . .” Condicio tacita, Implied Conditions und die Fortbildung des europäischen 
Vertragsrechts, 193 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 121 (1993). 
27   Thomas Duve, Von der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte zu einer Rechtsgeschichte 
Europas in globalhistorischer Perspektive, 20 J. FOR MAX PLANCK INST. FOR EUR. LEGAL 
HIST. 16 (2012) (a more nuanced analysis of the transfer and re-transfer of laws 
between European countries and what later became their colonies). 
28   See generally, HAROLD J. BERMAN, RECHT UND REVOLUTION: DIE 
BILDUNG DER WESTLICHEN RECHTSTRADITION (2001). 
29   Id. at 146, 215.  
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commercial exchange.30 Hence, there is a connection between the 
rediscovery of Roman law, the split of spiritual and temporal power, 
and the Crusades, which renders the intellectual history of Western law 
to that époque indispensable. 
One might alternatively argue that the starting point of my 
undertaking could and should be the discovery of the Americas in the 
fifteenth century and the conflict between the Spanish and English 
empires, without which the deeper intellectual history of the United 
States cannot be fully understood. New research initiated by Thomas 
Duve, the Director of the Max-Planck-Institut at Frankfurt am Main, 
emphasizes the cultural, political, and economic interaction and 
interchange between Europe and the “New World,” or the two 
Americas.31 My approach is more modest and is more closely tied to 
my European cultural roots, the younger history of codified 
continental law, and the established role of the state in the economy 
and society. 
This paper owes its origins to an invitation to speak on social 
justice in private law at the Cour de Cassation in Paris.32 Thinking 
about justice in the French academic and judicial environment must 
coincide–at least this is what I am convinced of–with an analysis of the 
connection between state-building and constitution-building, as well as 
private legal order building and codification in the aftermath of the 
French revolution 1789. Whilst such a starting point offers joint 
perspectives in comparing France and Germany, it falls short by not 
taking the United Kingdom into account. If anything, a parallel may be 
drawn between the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century 
and German state-building of the nineteenth century on the one hand, 
and the Civil War and the conflict between the English Crown and 
Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century on the other. This period, 
i.e. the seventeenth throughout the nineteenth century, is roughly the 
period I investigated in attempting to explain where the different 
patterns of freedom of social justice derive from. I use these findings 
                                                 
30   See id.  
31   See Duve, supra note 27.  
32   Hans-W. Micklitz, Speech at the Cour de Cassation Paris: From Social 
Justice to Participatory Justice (2007). 
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in my attempt to transfer them an understanding of the deeper layers 
of freedom of contract. 
V.         MODELING THE MANY FACES OF “FREEDOM OF CONTRACT” 
Table 1 illustrates my understanding of freedom of contract and 
regulation, rooted in intellectual history. This section will first explain the 
categorization of England, France, Germany, and the European 
Union.33 I will then provide a rough account of the socio-economic 
and political background to the different models of autonomy and 
regulation in those three countries and the European Union, thereby 
elaborating on the characteristics of the many faces of freedom of 
contract in a bottom-up perspective. 
  
                                                 
33   The following analysis is a developed and adjusted version of Hans-W. 
Micklitz, supra note 23. 
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Table 1: Understandings of Freedom of Contract, Regulation 
and Their Intellectual History (France, Germany, United Kingdom 
European Union) 
Country Model of 
freedom of 
contract 
Intellectual 
history 
Regulation 
France  A political 
project 
Code Civil 
French 
rationalism 
Enlightenment 
Regulating 
contracts as a 
political 
counter-
project  
Germany A liberal 
authoritarian/ 
paternalistic  
project 
Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch 
German idealism 
Metaphysics 
Regulating 
contracts as a 
technical 
bureaucratic 
exercise 
United 
Kingdom 
A liberal 
pragmatic 
project 
Common law 
Empiricism and 
Utilitarianism 
Pragmatism  
Regulating 
contracts to 
solve 
‘concrete 
Problems’ 
European 
Union 
A technocratic 
project 
Regulatory 
private law 
Instrumentalism 
and 
functionalism 
Regulated 
freedom – 
enabling and 
shaping 
autonomy 
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A.         The English Model: Liberal and Pragmatic 
In English history there is no comparable event to the 
adoption of the Civil Code in France or in Germany. The civil war that 
took place in the seventeenth century in England led to major changes 
in society and the parliamentarian system. However, the English Civil 
War neither yielded a constitution nor a coherent codified body of civil 
law; rather, it only made way for the Declaration of the Bill of Rights 
in 1689. The French and the German legal systems, as seen through 
the eyes of a common law lawyer (daring to suggest that this is possible 
for me, a civil law lawyer), share a relatively homogenous view on the 
role and function of freedom of contract in society. These legal 
systems are united in the idea of universal values that infiltrate legal 
principles and concepts. “Autonomy” or “autonomie” is at the core of 
these values, and this is exactly where common lawyers run into 
difficulties.34 
The true difference between continental law and common law 
dates further back than the French revolution, and it was crucial to 
identify the point at which the continental and common law systems 
diverged. I considered the clash between different philosophies, and 
to the remaining influence of the scholastic in continental Europe and 
its growing critique through nominalism in the United Kingdom. I also 
considered that the divergence occurred during medieval times when 
the relative cultural unity of Europe broke into pieces.35 Therefore, I 
think empiricism is responsible for the deep differences between 
continental and common law legal systems. Despite the strong 
intellectual exchange, especially between France and England, Hobbes 
imported ideas from France, Rousseau referred to John Locke, and the 
ideas and concepts of Francis Bacon’s empiricism became prevalent 
after the failure of Cromwell. Empiricism paved the way for 
utilitarianism–and here we have not only the key to understanding 
English reservations against regulatory intervention into the economy, 
                                                 
34   See Lord R. Goff, The Future of the Common Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
745 (1997). 
35   BERMAN, supra note 28, at 265. 
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but also the explanation for English pragmatism,36 which allows for 
regulatory intervention when there is a concrete need for action. 
Both historical strings, which are tied together in my discussion 
above, justify the assumption that the continental European 
understanding of freedom of contract does not comply with 
philosophical, historical, economic, and legal structures in England. In 
other words, England has paved the way for a legal system which is 
deeply rooted in nominalistic and utilitarian thinking. Freedom of 
contract lies at the crossroads of these deep roots in English 
intellectual history. Nominalism served to cut away the ideological 
barriers enshrined in the scholastic school of law and to free English 
contract law from the Pandectist heritage; utilitarianism went hand in 
hand with the rise of the English “trading state” (Handelsstaat), which 
has its origins in the nineteenth century.37 The heart of English 
contract law lies in the freedom of commerce and the freedom to 
conclude contracts. Freedom of contract, therefore, means first and 
foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic 
transactions without any risk of statutory interferences, with the 
exception of paying taxes to the Crown.38 
Compared to German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 
Schelling) and French Rationalism (Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, 
Rousseau), the English view of the role and function of contract law is 
much more economic in its basic assumptions. It is a much smaller 
argumentative step from utility to economic efficiency and economic 
effectiveness, compared with duty, reason, will, or spirit (Pflicht, 
Vernunft, Wille, Verstand, Geist). English contract law can be much 
more easily adapted to European “integration through law,”39 where 
                                                 
36   See Goff, supra note 34; Basil Markesinis, Learning from Europe and 
Learning in Europe, in THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN 
INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Basil 
Markesinis ed., 1994); Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads 
of Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (1991). 
37   See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1909). 
38   LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND THE FALL OF BRITISH EMPIRE (1st 
ed. 1994). 
39   See “INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE 
EUROPEAN POLITY (Daniel Augenstein ed., 2012); Integration Through Law: Europe and 
the American Federal Experience, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 3-68 (Mauro 
Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986). 
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the judicial system is given a major role in the realization of the Internal 
Market.40 
What is the relationship between the particular English variant 
of freedom of contract and English legal culture? The English state is 
a liberal state. Its function is not to control economic behavior but to 
guarantee freedom of contract. In the seventeenth century this 
concerned the merchant adventurer, today it concerns the business 
environment at large.41 Statutory intervention in the economy is 
feasible if there is a political need. Labor law and consumer law 
legislation illustrate this approach. The U.K. Parliament was at the 
forefront of consumer legislation. With regard to consumer credit and 
consumer safety, the U.K. Parliament has long set the benchmark for 
statutory intervention. Pragmatism is the guiding idea of statutory 
regulation restricting the freedom to contract. 
This approach can be felt in the way in which the transposition 
of European consumer law directives are integrated into the English 
system. Directive 99/44/EC42 is an example. The U.K. Parliament 
rejected any attempt to revise the English law on contracts. Such an 
attempt would have challenged the foundations of freedom of contract 
by creating a separate legislation to stand side-by-side with the 
common law on contracts on the one hand, and the Sale of Goods Act 
                                                 
40   No research has been undertaken as to whether there is a link between 
the adherence of the United Kingdom to the Europe Union and the deepening of 
European integration via case law. Whilst the building blocks van Gend en Loos and 
Costa Enel were decided before the UK joined the EU, the ground-breaking 
judgments of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon paved the way for the development of the 
Internal Market and were made with the participation of UK judges. Today’s pattern 
of integration might have changed. Christian Joerges, What is left of the integration 
through law project? A reconstruction in conflicts-law perspectives, in THE EUROPEAN RESCUE 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION? 37-67 (Edoardo Chiti, Augustín José Menéndez, Pedro 
Gustavo Teixeira eds. 2012) (speaks of “integration without law,” referring to the 
dominance of politics and the influential role of governance.) 
41   PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
(1985); DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (showing that the real turning point was between 1790 and 
1830, when the last remnants of just price were stripped away). 
42   Council Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer 
goods and associates guarantees, 1999 O.J. (L 171) (EC). 
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on the other.43 Under E.U. Directive 93/13/EEC, a similar continuity 
can be demonstrated in the recent decisions of the House of Lords on 
the control of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts.44 This piece 
of E.U. law has led to irritation in the English system, as it submits 
standard terms to a general fairness test, an approach which runs 
counter to the ideology of the English Parliament,45 where regulatory 
intervention is not meant to challenge the significance of freedom of 
contract in general but to solve concrete problems.46 
In conclusion, the basic formula which lies at the heart of 
English legal culture can be condensed into one single formula–what 
is useful is right. Here nominalism, empiricism and utilitarianism come 
together. Freedom of contract is foundational to the common law on 
contracts, and statutory intervention is acceptable as long as it aims at 
solving concrete consumer or labor concerns. 
B.         The French Model: Rational and Political 
France has a particular historical role in the legal and 
theoretical discourse on the interrelationship between constitution-
building and the making of private legal order. The results of the 
French revolution are still shaping our understanding of constitutions, 
civil codes, “contract,” and “tort” today. In only twenty years the key 
events in France which would define these notions occurred. In 
contrast, in the United Kingdom similar notions developed from an 
evolutionary process, where no clear-cut moment of constitution 
building and private legal order making can be fixed. The French 
Revolution led to a break with feudalistic structures47 and instituted a 
                                                 
43   See LUCINDA MILLER, THE EMERGENCE OF EU CONTRACT LAW – 
EXPLORING EUROPEANIZATION (2011) (analyzing the struggle in the UK over the 
implementation of Directive 99/44). 
44   Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).  
45   See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
46   See Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey Nat’l plc & Others, [2009] UKSC 
6, [2010] 1 A.C. 696 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales); General of Fair Trading v. 
First Nat’l Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] A.C. 481 (appeal taken from Eng. and 
Wales); Hein Kötz, Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle bei den Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen 
der Banken: Entscheidung des britischen Supreme Court, 25 ZEuP 332 (2012). 
47   See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). 
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bourgeois society governed by individual freedom and equality of 
rights, which became even more visible in the Code Civil and in the 
French Constitution.48 The Revolution’s legacy can easily be found in 
the German Civil Code, which was adopted a century later. 
To portray the French understanding of freedom of contract 
and regulation, I start from two premises. First, the vision of the 
French revolution, which was proclaimed in the Declaration of Human 
Rights, pinned down in a Constitution, and later codified in the Civil 
Code, has deeper social, cultural, economic, and intellectual roots. I 
argue that today’s conception of freedom of contract in France can 
best be understood as a political forward-looking concept, which can 
be traced back to French Rationalism49 and Descartes.50 
Secondly, French society may be characterized by the tension 
between intellectual projects guided by “les grandes idées,”–the French 
Constitution and the French Code–which strengthen the power of the 
Executive to the detriment of the Judiciary, and the highly politicized 
bottom-up resistance against an excessively far-reaching executive 
power.51 The fight over “the Social”52—the regulatory intervention to 
protect workers in employment contracts and later the consumers in 
business to consumer (B2C) contracts—has demonstrated that setting 
limits to freedom of contract through statutory intervention is a highly 
politicized matter that is subject to potential conflicts. 
Just as in England, the intellectual turning point in France can 
be attributed to the fading influence of scholastic thinking.  Academic 
                                                 
48   See FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 343 
(1967). 
49   For a deeper analysis, see LAURENCE BONJOUR, IN DEFENSE OF PURE 
REASON (1998); Laurence BonJour, A Rationalist Manifesto, 18 CANADIAN J. OF PHIL. 
SUPPLEMENTARY 53 (1992). 
50   See EGON FRIEDELL, KULTURGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT: DIE KRISE 
DER EUROPÄISCHEN SEELE VON DER SCHWARZEN PEST BIS ZUM ERSTEN 
WELTKRIEG (2007) (discussing Descartes and his methodological thinking). 
51   This is my own interpretation of the French development. 
52   See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 19, 95 (discussing the rise of “The Social” 
and its intellectual origins); from a German perspective, but taking the French impact 
into account, in particular Duguit, Salleilles and Gény, see Wieacker, supra note 48, at 
543 § 28 (“Der Zerfall der inneren Einheit des Privatrechts und das Sozialrecht”.) In 
that vain, law has a particular social function to fulfill. 
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questioning of the spirit evolved from the methodological constraints 
of scholasticism and paved the way for a new rational method in 
philosophy. French philosopher Michel Eyguem de Montaigne (1533-
1592) set long-lasting incentives for critical reflection of all existing 
knowledge and values, which later came to be known as 
“Enlightenment.”53 This new method to investigate the “truth” and 
the concept of the truth was left in the seventeenth century to 
Descartes, who began with his Discours de la Méthode.54 Descartes 
claimed that a particular method to acquire the truth was needed to 
solve all philosophical questions. Unlike utilitarianism, Descartes 
believed that what is true is useful. Without Descartes’s theory, it is 
difficult to understand the political conception of the French Civil 
Code. Descartes’ philosophy results in the priority of theory over 
practice, which is the basic thesis of French intellectualism. 
Based on this premise, the link between the French political 
project of freedom of contract and the particularities of the French 
legal culture become clear. Freedom of contract is first and foremost 
tied to the key function of the “reason,” “raison,” or “Vernunft” in the 
French civil law system. The idea is that freedom of contract is more 
than just an exercise to maximize mutual economic benefit. More is at 
stake in the communication between the parties, namely, the 
commitment to a contract is the product of a reasonable decision. 
Autonomie de la volonté is bound in the belief or assumption (“Einsicht”) 
in a higher reason that is deeper than the individual transaction.55 This 
is the Cartesian side of the concept of autonomie de la volonté. However, 
there is also the Rousseauean side, and it is here where the political 
dimension of the concept of automomie de la volonté is more obvious. 
Autonomie de la volonté may not be equated with individual freedom in 
the meaning of German idealism, which is inward looking. To the 
contrary, it is outward looking toward society itself and to the 
embedding of reason into the political environment. This is what 
Rousseau called the volonté générale (general will). Without Rousseau’s 
concept of democracy and the conviction that the people will consent 
                                                 
53   See FRIEDELL, supra note 50. 
54   RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE 
SA RAISON, ET CHERCHER LA VÉRITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES (1637).  
55   This implies the need to look for a certain substantive equivalence in 
the mutual contractual relations, in German “das materielle Äquivalenzprinzip der 
vernunftsrechtlichen Vertragslehre.”  
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to the volonté générale, it is not possible to understand the political 
dimension of the concept of autonomy in the French civil code.56 
In France, there is also a peculiar understanding of the role and 
function of regulatory intervention in the economy to protect workers 
and consumers and, more in general, to restrict freedom of contract in 
commercial transactions through statutory regulation. Since 
mercantilist times, the French government played a strong role in the 
organization and creation of the economy.57 The economy must follow 
political prerogatives in order to address social concerns and any other 
political requirements. What matters for our discussion is the strong 
connection between the role and function of the political, and the 
understanding of regulatory intervention. The political dimension 
must not necessarily materialize in a top-down fashion, i.e. through 
legislative acts on what nowadays is called social regulation or 
executive intervention into the management of the economy of the 
country. The political may also emerge bottom-up, through resistance 
on the streets against the supremacy of the state managed economy 
over politics. 
To demonstrate the continuity of the French legal conscience 
(Rechtsbewußtsein) and of the breadth and depth of the political in social 
regulation, I will again start with reference to the implementation of 
E.U. Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales. Under strong pressure 
from civil lawyers and civil law doctrine, the French legislature decided 
that, rather than integrate the rules on consumer protection into the 
Civil Code, it would place the respective articles in the Code de la 
Consommation.58 This strategy preserved the integrity of the Civil Code 
as an “eternal” political project, which might be regarded as an integral 
part of the French identity.59 However, there is one notable difference 
                                                 
56   I am fully aware that Rousseau differs from Descartes in his image of 
the person. 
57   See KARL PRIBRAM, GESCHICHTE DES ÖKONOMISCHEN DENKENS, [A 
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REASONING] 194 (Erster Band ed., Horst Brühmann trans., 
1998); COLIN HEYWOOD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY 1750-
1914 (1995). 
58   See MILLER, supra note 43 (reconstructing the political fights over the 
correct way to implement Directive 99/44 in the French legal system). 
59   French scholars had a strong reaction against the idea of a European 
Civil Code. See YVES LEQUETTE, QUELQUES REMARQUES A PROPOS DU PROJET DE 
CODE CIVIL EUROPEEN DE MONSIEUR VON BAR 2202-14 (2002); Bénédicte 
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to the English method of transposition. Contrary to the problem based 
U.K. approach on consumer protection, the French Code de la 
Consommation was originally designed according to a political model, a 
blueprint which was similar to the Civil Code in that it could guide the 
development in Europe of a consistent body of consumer law rules.60 
Contrary to most other Member States in the European Union, 
the consumer movement in France bore a strong political dimension, 
at least in the 1970s and 1980s, which largely derived from 
politicization through integrating consumer policy into politics. Trade 
unions in France were tied to various left wing parties, each of which 
had to leave their footprint on the then new policy.61 It is only because 
the European Union took over consumer policy in the second half of 
                                                 
Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il un code civil européen?, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
CIVIL 463 (2002); see also Christian Joerges, Der Europäisierungsprozess als Herausforderung 
des Privatrechts: Plädoyer für eine neue Rechtsdisziplin, in EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT IM 
WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN DISKURS 133, 142 (Andreas Furrer ed., 2006) (interpreting 
the conflict between the German professorial model of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) and the democratic tradition of the Code Civil); Wolfgang Wurmnest, Common 
Core, Grundregeln, Kodifikationsentwürfe, Acquis-Grundsätze – Ansätze internationaler 
Wissenschaftlergruppen zur Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung in Europa, 11 ZEUP 714 (2003); 
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit europen des contrats: première réaction au plan d’áction 
de la Commission, RECUEIL DALLOZ 1171 (2003); Philippe Malinvaud, Réponse-hors 
délai-à la Commission européenne: à propos d’un code européenne des contrats, in PENSEE 
JURIDIQUE FRANCAISE ET HARMONISATION EUROPEENNE DU DROIT 231 
(Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2003)  ; JEAN HUET, NOUS 
FAUT-IL UN ‘EURO’ DROIT CIVIL? 2611-14 (2002). Whether or not the French Civil 
Code would pass the identity test under the Lisbon Treaty is another story. See Hans-
W. Micklitz, German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht BVerfG) 2 BvE 2/08, 
30.6.2009 – Organstreit Proceedings between Members of the German Parliament and the Federal 
Government, 7 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 528 (2011). 
60   JEAN CALAIS-AULOY, COMMISSION DE LA REFONTE, LE DROIT DE LA 
CONSOMMATION EN FRANCE (1981). 
61   This might explain why attempts to build connections between labor 
law and consumer law were particulary strong in France, to some extent in Italy, and 
only marginal in Germany. See MICHEL MIAILLE, UNE INTRODUCTION CRITIQUE 
AU DROIT (1976); ENZO ROPPO, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND KLASSENTHEORIE 
109 (1976); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE 
AUFGABE 252 (1979); KLAUS TONNER, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND 
KLAASSENTHEORIE – ERWIDERUNG AUF ENZO ROPPO 241 (1976). 
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the 1980s after the Single European Act62 that consumer policy became 
de-politicized in France. 
C.         The German Model: Liberal and Authoritarian/Paternalistic 
The German Civil Code is 100 years younger than the French 
Civil Code. In 1815, the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna and the 
scattered German regions that comprised various kingdoms and 
counties (earldoms) failed to unite into a German state under a 
common constitution. It took until 1871 before Germany managed, 
under the regime of the Prussian king and his chancellor Bismarck, to 
finally adopt a constitution. It took an additional thirty years before the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), as it is called in German, was enacted. 
My arguments are built upon two major guiding assumptions. 
First, there is a direct line from Kant to Savigny to Weber and the 
formal rationality of the private law system, which serves to constitute 
the capitalist society. The Kantian philosophy inspired Savigny to 
formulate the so-called Historische Schule (Historical School), which was 
influential during the nineteenth century among private law theorists 
and, remarkably, continues to be influential even after the fall of the 
wall in 1989.63 Historische Schule has created a particular way of thinking, 
favoring the transition from “The Social” to the “pure” private law 
system. Social issues and regulations were outsourced by a technocratic 
decision to specialize private law legislation outside the BGB, although 
adopted 100 years later than the more integrative approach of the 
French Code Civil.64 This time period gave the German BGB a 
                                                 
62   Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) (entered into 
force July 1, 1987). 
63   See Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative 
Law, and the Emergence of a European Science, 112 L.Q. REV. 576 (1996); Horst 
Eidenmüller et al., The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy Choices 
and Codification Problems, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659 (2008) (criticizing the 
European private law codification project, which is inspired from and based on the 
destruction of the common philosophical ground of private law in the civil and 
common law systems). 
64   Both the French Code Civil and the German BGB covered tenant law. 
In France, tenant law has remained an integral part of the civil code, whereas German 
tenant law has become a legal field in itself, outsourced in special acts and only 
partially integrated in the BGB through the modernization of the law of obligations 
(Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in 2002. For details on the development of 
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particular ideological outlook, which maintained and defended an early 
nineteenth century bourgeois model of society and economy against 
the rising political and social transformations brought about by the 
industrial age and the labor movement.65 
Second, there is the link between Fichte, Hegel, Thibaut, 
German idealism, and legal naturalism, as expressed in Jhering, von 
Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber, and Kantorowicz wherein national ideals were 
tied to the social ideals of a society and a nation.66 Such a vision can 
hardly be connected to the authoritarian Prussian state, which 
provided social protection to workers67 only as a means to compensate 
workers for their exclusion from political participation (Sozialistengesetze 
1978). The German version of legal naturalism favors an instrumental 
use of social regulation, but carefully avoids and downplays the 
political dimension inherent in “The Social.”68 
The intellectual quarrel between two German law professors, 
Thibaut and Savigny, over the value of a codified German Civil Code 
is paradigmatic for tensions arising in the German legal system: 
Thibaut fought enthusiastically in Heidelberg–inspired by German 
Idealism and les grandes idées of the French revolution–for a genuine 
German Code; Savigny fought brilliantly (but not enthusiastically) for 
the maintenance of the old Roman law.69 Law-making in Germany in 
the early nineteenth century was understood as an academic exercise, 
quite contrary to the democratic discussion that surrounded the 
                                                 
tenant law in Europe, see Christoph U. Schmid & Jason R. Dinse, The European 
Dimension of Residential Tenancy Law, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 201 (2013).  
65   There is a connection between the late industrialization relative to the 
UK, the labor movement, and the Bismarckian reaction. See, e.g., HUGO SINZHEIMER, 
EIN ARBEITSTARIFGESETZ: DIE IDEE DER SOZIALEN SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM 
RECHT (1916).  
66   See WIEACKER, supra note 48. Most of the legal auxiliary sciences such 
as criminology and legal sociology have their origin in legal naturalism and in the 
Freirechtsschule (Free Law Movement). 
67   E.g., 1883 health insurance, 1884 accident insurance. 
68   See Hermann U. Kantorowicz who attacks Savigny’s influence on the 
construction of the Civil Code and on what I call here “Rechtsbewußtsein”. 
Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Was ist uns Savigny, 1 RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT 47, 76 
and seq. (1911). 
69   ANTON FRIEDRICH JUSTUS THIBAUT & FRIEDRICH CARL VON 
SAVIGNY, IHRE PROGRAMMATISCHEN SCHRIFTEN, MIT EINER EINFÜHRUNG VON 
HANS HATTENHAUER (1973). 
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adoption and distribution of the French Civil Code.70  The outcome 
was a civil code that lacked the required “socialist oil.”71 This defect 
was remedied in the twentieth century by judges through judge-made 
law, and by the legislator through the adoption of numerous special 
laws. 
German legal culture has two main components: a liberal 
dimension, which is shared by English law and enshrined in 
commercial freedom to contract; and a political dimension, which is 
shared by French law and enshrined in the much stronger commitment 
to “The Social.”72 The English streak dates back to the merging of the 
German Länder (states) under a tight Prussian grip, which triggered the 
industrial revolution and led to an amazing boost for the economy. In 
this context, the predominance of the market and a sense of English 
pragmatism can be felt. The German state, however, is not a liberal-
enabling state in the Anglo-Saxon sense. The German state is rooted 
in the authoritarian heritage of pre-democratic times. As such, the state 
is seen as the key regulator to realize not only economic but also 
political objectives, which brings German legal culture nearer to its 
French counterpart. However, contrary to France where the political 
also bears a strong top-down dimension, the political dimension in 
Germany is more bottom-up as it is always connected to expectations 
set by the citizens of the state. Today, the early Bismarkian regulatory 
state and the post-World War II welfare state still bears elements of 
authoritarian care-taking, which is different from England due to the 
strong interventionist side and different from France due to the lack 
of an open political discourse. The tension between the liberals and the 
                                                 
70   See Reinhard Zimmermann, Consumer Contract Law and General Contract 
Law: The German Experience, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 415 (2005); Harm Schepel, 
Professorenrecht? The Field of European Private Law, in LAWYER’S CIRCLES – LAWYERS 
AND EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 115 (2004); Rainer Maria Kiesow, 
Rechtswissenschaft – was ist das?, 12 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 585, 586 (2010). 
71   OTTO VAN GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 13 
(1889); TILMAN REPGEN, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE 
GRUNDFRAGE IN WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19. 
JAHRHUNDERTS (2001). 
72   GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM 
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 1: VON DER GRÜDERZEIT ZUR WEIMARER 
REPUBLIK (1977); GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS IM 
ORGANISIERTEN KAPITALISMUS, BAND 2: VOM FASCHISMUS BIS ZUR GEGENWART 
(1979). 
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authoritarians explains why political debates in Germany so easily turn 
into ideological conflicts, just as it was between Thibaut and Savigny. 
What does this mean for the German variant of freedom of 
contract—or private autonomy (Privatautonomie) as phrased in the 
context of the intellectual history—and the limitation of freedom of 
contract via statutory regulation? Private autonomy centers on the 
individual. But who is the individual? The reasonable Cartesian French 
person/citizen, the utilitarian Englishman, or the idealistic 
Kantian/Hegelian subject? The key question in German legal theory—
although not in commercial transactions, freedom of contract, the 
common law of contracts, or the droit des obligations—is how this 
individual can bind himself legally. The conceptual difference is visible 
in the comparison between the common law and the German Civil 
Code. Only the German BGB contains a General Part (Allgemeiner Teil), 
which not only precedes the law of contract, but also precedes family 
law and the law of succession. The General Part holds the entire 
German private law system, as laid down in the BGB, together. Its 
content triggers irritation and uncertainty outside Germany (what is a 
juridical act? Ein Rechtsgeschäft?73). The key to understanding the 
idealistic German concept of private autonomy is to appreciate its 
roots in the so-called “will theory” (Willenstheorie), which states that the 
individual is bound through his will, rather than through his 
declaration (Erklärung).74 It is true that the Prussian legislator 
introduced corrections to the “will theory” into the BGB, which have 
been amplified by the judiciary in the twentieth century. Idealistic 
thinking embedded in the concept of private autonomy is still alive: it 
has been taken up by the Freiburg school, ordo-liberalism, and the 
private law society.75 Its counterpart, the resistance against restrictions, 
more often than not bears a strong ideological bias that is outweighed 
                                                 
73   The Academic Draft Common Frame of Reference contains such a 
general part in compliance with the German BGB. 
74   The “will theory” is extremely helpful because it combines European 
legal thought with American legal thought. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory 
to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 94 (2000). 
75   See ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW: 
POSNER V. HAYEK ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 174 (2007) (responding to the 
critics of law and economics against ordo-liberalism). 
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by intense legislative activities in the twentieth century for the benefit 
of those contracting parties with weaker bargaining power. 
Again, I will use Directive 99/44/EC as a blueprint to explain 
the continuity of the German Rechtsbewusstsein and the tension between 
the liberal and authoritarian views of freedom of contract. In the 
shadow of the so-called modernization of German contract law 
(Schuldrechts-Modernisierungsgesetz) in 2002, the executive, i.e., the 
Ministry of Justice, used the expiry of the two-year implementation 
period to complete the twenty-year long pending project of revising 
the German Civil Code, thereby “smuggling” the bulk of consumer 
contract law rules into the German Civil Code. This integration of Civil 
Code and consumer contract law perhaps was not an authoritarian, but 
a paternalistic move.76 The academic debates focused almost entirely 
on the proposed revision of the prescription rules, in particular, on 
Leistungsstörungsrecht (law on the interference with or impairment of the 
performance of an obligation). This revision has been performed as a 
technical bureaucratic exercise.77 Pragmatism might have guided 
German scholars to accept the development of a new sales law, as a 
common pattern for business to business (B2B) and B2C relations; 
however, contrary to France and the Netherlands, there was no deeper 
political discussion, especially on the possible role of consumer law as 
an integral part of the civil code, in the open democratic fora in 
Germany. Until today, consumer law has remained a foreign body in 
                                                 
76   There is a deeper discussion needed on the difference between 
(Prussian) authoritarianism and (post-Second World War) German paternalism. See 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. VI (1835), for a starting 
point on this distinction (“[a]bove this race of men stands an immense and tutelary 
power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over 
their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be 
like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for 
manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is 
well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but 
rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to 
be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, 
foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their 
principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and 
subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking 
and all the trouble of living?”). 
77   See, e.g., Stephan Lorenz, Fünf Jahre “neues” Schuldrecht im Spiegel der 
Rechtsprechung, 1-2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1 (2007). 
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the German BGB. The integration of “The Social” has not led to an 
overall re-thinking of the foundations of the German BGB. Instead, 
the two parts, although located in the same civil code, are each rooted 
in their very particular intellectual history.78 
D.        The European Model: Enabling and Restricting 
Over the last sixty years, the European legal order and the 
European constitutional charter79 have yielded a genuine model of 
freedom of contract to protect participants in an ever-growing Internal 
Market. At the same time, however, the European legal order and 
constitutional charter have also set boundaries to this established 
freedom of contract.80 How is it possible that the European Union is 
able to generate a distinct model, different from national ones? I am 
not so much interested in whether the emerging European model 
should be understood as some kind of reaction to the globalization of 
markets.81 My focus is on the intellectual history of the European legal 
order that underpins Europe and the European Union. Although 
Europe and the European Union are intertwined, they must be kept 
separate in our discussion. 
Perspective matters. Europe is treated as a homogenous whole 
by those on the outside, and particularly by U.S. legal scholars. Two 
examples of such over-generalized discussions about Europe include 
the work of James Whitman on U.S. consumerism versus E.U. 
                                                 
78   See HANS-W. MICKLITZ, BRAUCHEN KONSUMENTEN UND 
UNTERNEHMEN EINE NEUE ARCHITEKTUR DES VERBRAUCHERRECHTS? GUT-
ACHTEN A ZUM 69. JURISTENTAG 129 (2012); Hans-W. Micklitz, Do Consumers and 
Business Need a New Architecture for Consumer Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse, 32 Y.B. 
EUROPEAN L. 266 (2012). 
79   Neil Walker, Big “C” or Small “c”?, 12 EUR. L.J., 12 (2006). 
80   See Guido Comparato & Hans-W. Micklitz, Regulated Autonomy between 
Market Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the CJEU, in GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 121-54 (Ulf Bernitz, Xavier 
Groussot & Felix Schulyok eds., 2013); NORBERT REICH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
EU CIVIL LAW (2013). 
81   KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); KARL 
POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL 
MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011). 
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producerism,82 and the work of Daniel Kelemen on Eurolegalism.83 In 
general, scholars tend to treat the south and north, the east and west, 
and the European Union and European Council the same. Similarly, 
there is little discussion in contemporary research on where Europe 
ends: European countries are considered a single entity, this entity is 
often implicitly equated with the European Union, and then the entity 
is compared with the United States.84 
Does the conception of freedom of contract and its statutory 
limitation reflect a common denominator of English Utilitarianism, 
French Rationalism, and German Idealism? Is there a foundation 
shared by the English liberal and pragmatic, French rational and 
political, and German liberal and authoritarian? To what extent does 
this intellectual crossover mutually impact England, France, and 
Germany? Those who stress a common cultural foundation insist on 
an intellectual exchange between the great minds behind the concepts 
of empiricism, utilitarianism, rationalism, enlightenment, and idealism. 
For centuries, European intellectuals shared a common language, 
Latin, which gradually vanished between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The deeper cultural foundation, however, cannot 
be based in language alone. For example, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, leading private lawyers from all over Europe 
and the United States were involved in intellectual exchange, but all 
wrote in their respective languages.85 It seems as if the intellectual 
                                                 
82   James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in 
Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 407 (2007). 
83   R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). 
84   This kind of stereotyped, over-simplified thinking has been promoted 
by the Integration Through Law Project by Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe, 
and Joseph Weiler to compare the constitutional architecture of the then European 
Economic Community and the United States. See INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: 
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 39, at 3-68; 
“INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW” REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN 
POLITY, supra note 39. This kind of thinking might be due to the historical 
circumstances in which it took places. In the mid 1980s there was still the political 
idea pending that the Member States of the European Union would be ready and 
willing to transform the European Union into a fully fledged federal United States 
of Europe.   
85   René Demogue, La Notion de Sujet De Droit, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
DROIT CIVIL 611-55 (1909); RECUEIL SIREY, ÉVOLUTIONS ET ACTUALITES 
CONFERENCES DE DROIT CIVIL 29-51 (1936).  
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
28 
exchange was much more intense hundreds of years ago than it is 
today, since today the English language dominates the intellectual 
discourse and non-English contributions to the intellectual history of 
Europe are no longer perceived. 
Wieacker is perhaps one of the few scholars who looks behind 
the three main intellectual historical strains and condenses the 
common European legal culture that unites the private law in der 
Neuzeit86 (in modern times) into three invariables. The first invariable 
is personalism, which is directly connected to the role of the individual, 
autonomy, and freedom in private law. The second invariable is 
legalism in which decisions are bound to the rule of law. The third 
invariable is European intellectualism, which drives European legal 
thinking in the direction of thematization, conceptualization, and 
contradiction-free consistency of the law. 
Is Wieacker’s theory correct? Is the revitalization of the 
common European legal culture after the Second World War not 
guided by the political purpose it had to fulfill? Can the common 
European legal culture be regarded as an attempt to rewrite legal 
history? I fear that these questions are too broad for this paper.87 The 
debate on the possible legal philosophical foundations of Europe88 and 
European private law89 is just about to start. The handbook edited by 
Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis90 on the philosophical 
foundations of E.U. law mainly focuses on European constitutional 
                                                 
86   This is the title of Franz Wieacker’s masterpiece, which was translated 
into English by Tony Weir. See generally WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER 
NEUZEIT, supra note 48. 
87   See, e.g., WOLFRAM KAISER, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE 
ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN UNION (2007); RAOUL CHARLES VAN CAENEGEM, 
EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO 
MILLENNIA (2002); FRIEDRICH HEER, THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF EUROPE 
(1968); see also Kolleg-Forschergruppe Working Paper Series, KOLLEG-FORSCHERGRUPPE: 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF EUROPE, (2009-2015) available at 
http://www.polsoz.fu-
berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/index.html. 
88   See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE 
GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA: HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE (2014). 
89   THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Roger 
Brownsword et al. eds., 2011). 
90   PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Julie 
Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012). 
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theory, rather than European private law and European private law 
theory.91 
To understand the European model of freedom of contract, it 
is helpful to look at the intellectual history, and perhaps the 
constitutional history, of the European Union. This understanding 
requires a leap to the post-war period, when the European Economic 
Community was launched and the European Union was created.  
Scholars92 advocated for the revitalization and re-invigoration of a 
common European culture to enable a peaceful and prosperous future 
for the European peoples. For example, scholars advocated for peace 
through economic integration, and in 1986, the Single European Act 
added social integration to the new European legal order.93 
Economic integration of the European Union is based on the 
free movement rights and competition. In particular, German 
academics in the ordo-liberal tradition have argued that private 
autonomy is enshrined into the free movement rights.94 Economic 
integration aims at enabling the growth of, or paving the way for, 
private entrepreneurship in the ever-bigger common European 
market. The abundant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
on the four freedoms often involves contractual disputes in which one 
party seeks access to the market but is barred by national statutory 
                                                 
91   The Oxford University Press series, where Julie Dickson and Paylos 
Eleftheriadis also appeared, includes an ongoing project on the philosophical 
foundations of private law. 
92   These scholars include academics such as Wieacker, Grossi, and Coing, 
and political scholars such as Monnet, Schuman, de Gaspari, de Gaulle, and 
Adenauer. 
93   Fritz Scharpf was one of the most influential scholars in this field. See 
generally FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 
(1999) (analyzing the relationship between economic and social integration in 
Europe). 
94   See Stefan Grundmann, The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50 
Years of European and European Business Law, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 553 (2008). For 
a nice account of the European economic constitution and its influence on 
(European) private law, see Sabine Frerichs & Teemu Juutilainen, Rome under Seven 
Hills? An Archeology of European Private Law (Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper 
Ser., Paper No. 32, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465873. 
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regulation.95 Private autonomy then obtains a different meaning, 
namely, it is bound to trans-border business and European economic 
integration. The European variant is functional and instrumental. 
Social regulation in European private law is very much focused 
on consumer protection.96 The tone of such social regulation is set by 
the famous Sutherland Report.97 Consumers and consumer protection 
rules are needed to complete the Internal Market (the 1986 program 
behind the Single European Act). Putting it differently, the price to pay 
for the Completion of the Internal Market is the adoption of minimum 
social (protection) standards.98 The overall philosophy is enshrined in 
the wording of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Europe Union (TFEU), formerly Article 95 EC and Article 100a 
respectively, which adopted measures to complete the Internal Market 
in realizing social protection standards.99 In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, several consumer and labor protection rules were adopted 
under the unanimity principle, the enabling of autonomy and the 
limitation of autonomy go hand-in-hand. The broadening of economic 
freedoms, similar to common law freedom of contract, preceded the 
development of protective standards that limited freedom of contract, 
mainly through binding legal standards. 
This development is by no means limited to the field of 
traditional private law, contract law and consumer protection, or 
employment contracts and labor protection. European private law is 
                                                 
95   Gareth Davies, Freedom of Contract and the Horizontal Effect of Free 
Movement Law, in THE INVOLVEMENT OF EU LAW IN PRIVATE LAW RELATIONSHIPS 
(Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2013). 
96   See Weatherill, supra note 19; HANS-W. MICKLITZ ET AL., EUROPEAN 
CONSUMER Law (2d ed., 2014). 
97   PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING 
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: REPORT BY THE 
CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI 
(2004).  
98   The European Commission has made an enormous effort after 2000 
to transform the minimum social protection standards into maximum standards. 
However, this effort has largely failed. See Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, Crónica 
de una Muerte Anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a “Directive on Consumer Rights,” 46 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 417 (2009). 
99   Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 114, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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regulatory by nature, as the European Union is and will be under 
constant construction. Legal rules remain a key instrument for 
regulation. The most prominent field of action beyond traditional 
private law and even traditional fields of social regulation (e.g., 
consumer and labor protection) has been the so-called regulated 
markets. The liberalization and privatization policy implemented by 
the Single European Act in telecom, energy, postal services, transport, 
and financial services, the dismantling of former state monopolies, 
amounts to a political decision to establish markets where there were 
none.100 This policy enabled freedom of contract with statutory 
limitations. Therefore, enabling and restricting are the two parameters 
that characterize the European model of freedom of contract. 
E.         Stand and Stare 
Provided my analysis contains an element of truth–and I hope 
it does–what is the added value of this finding for our understanding 
of freedom of contract and even more so for the communication 
between lawyers across legal cultures and traditions, just like those 
lawyers in our Academy for International Commercial and Consumer 
Law? First and foremost, the value added is to “Stand and Stare,”101 
and to distance ourselves from our subjects of analysis and own 
cultural roots and traditions. 
“Stand and Stare,” however, is just the first step. I do not want 
to argue that our legal cultures and traditions are set in stone and that 
there is no room for mutual learning and for change. Indeed, there is 
arguably an emerging European legal culture, certainly in key areas of 
                                                 
100   See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Private Law, 28 
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 3 (2009); in Italian, La mano visibile del diritto privato 
europeo in materia normativa – La trasformazione del diritto privato europeo dall’autonomia al 
funzionalismo nella concorrenza e enella regolamentazione, in SEMINARI DEL CONSIGLIO 
NAZIONALE FORENSE: COLLANA “STUDI STORICI E GIURIDICI” 125-92 (Guido 
Alpa & Roberta Mazzei, eds. 2010); in Finnish, Lakimies 3/2010, 330-56; in Japanese, 
Yōroppa kisei watashi-hō no mokuteki-teki shuhō: Yōroppa watashi-hō no, kyōsō to kisei ni okeru 
jiritsu kara kinō shugi e no hen’yō, 12 HOKKAIDO JOURNAL OF NEW GLOBAL LAW AND 
POLICY 17 (2011); in French, La main visible du droit privé réglementaire Européen, 28  
REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 5-57 (2014).  
101   Roger Brownsword, The Theoretical Foundations of European Private Law: 
A time to Stand and Stare, in FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 159 (Roger 
Brownsword et al. eds., 2011). 
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private law102–some would argue this legal culture has been enshrined 
in Europe since the ius commune. There is also an emerging culture of 
transnational law,103 which is now gaining ever stronger attention with 
a refocused understanding and design of comparative and 
transnational (legal) history.104 I fear, however, that we are approaching 
a divided legal world—a world where each state contains a national 
legal order in which the territory and language are transnational. There 
is a chance for deepening our understanding of the “many faces of 
freedom of contract,” for learning from each other and for developing 
even a common cultural ground.105 
                                                 
102   TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (Genevieve Helleringer & 
Kai Purnhagen eds., 2014). 
103   See Kaarlo Tuori, Transnational Law: on Legal Hybrids and Legal 
Perspectivism, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW, RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL 
THINKING 11 (Miguel Madur, Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014). 
104   See Thomas Duve, European Legal History – Global Perspectives Working 
paper for the Colloquium “European Normativity – Global Historical Perspectives” (Max Planck 
Inst. for Euro. Legal Hist. Research Paper Ser. No. 2013-06, 2013). 
105   See Hans-W. Micklitz, An Essay on the Bifurcation of Legal Education - 
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